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Offshoring and Directed Technical Change
By Daron Acemoglu, Gino Gancia, and Fabrizio Zilibotti∗
We study the implications of offshoring on innovation, technology
adoption, and wage inequality in a Ricardian model with directed
technical change. In our model, profit maximization determines
both the extent of offshoring and the direction of technological
progress. A fall in the cost of offshoring induces technical change
with an ambiguous factor bias. When the initial cost of offshoring
is high, an increase in offshoring opportunities causes a fall in the
real wages of unskilled workers in the industrialized world, skill-
biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. When
the offshoring cost is sufficiently low, instead, further increases in
offshoring opportunities induce technical change biased in favor of
the unskilled workers.
(JEL: F43, O31, O33)
The rapid rise of offshoring, which involves many production and service tasks
that were previously produced domestically now being sourced from abroad, has
been a salient trend in the US labor market over the last three decades. The share
of imported inputs in total intermediate use in US manufacturing, for example,
has increased from about 6% in 1980 to over 27% today (Feenstra and Jensen
2012), and intermediate inputs account for two thirds of world trade. Offshoring
does not only create efficiency gains by enabling the transfer of production to
countries with lower labor costs. It also has distributional effects that can have
negative consequences on the wages of less skilled workers in advanced economies.1
This paper shows that the effect of a reduction in offshoring costs on wages
in the industrialized world hinges on the impact of offshoring on the direction of
technical change. Though there is a vibrant debate on the exact contribution of
skill-biased technical change to wage inequality in industrialized economies, the
broad consensus is that the more rapid rise in the demand for skills than the sup-
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ply has been at the root of much of it and that more skill-biased technologies, at
given factor supplies, tend to increase wage inequality (e.g., Autor et al. 2003 and
2008; Acemoglu and Autor 2011). It is also evident that offshoring opportunities
should affect the skill bias of technology. Our analysis shows that the induced
impact of offshoring on technology first amplifies its negative distributional con-
sequences, but then as the extent of offshoring expands further, its induced effect
on technology changes sign and becomes an equalizing force. Thus, the overall
impact on wage inequality of an increase in offshoring opportunities is inverse
U-shaped.
In our model, a unique final good is produced by combining a skilled and
an unskilled product, each produced from a continuum of intermediates (tasks).
Offshoring takes the form of some of these intermediates being transferred from
an industrialized (henceforth, the West) to an emerging (henceforth, the East)
economy, and is potentially efficiency enhancing because it reallocates production
towards countries where wages are lower. In our model, offshoring is subject to
both fixed and variable costs, and thus can increase both at the extensive margin
(more intermediates being offshored) and at the intensive margin (lower costs for
intermediates already being offshored).
Our main results concern the effects of offshoring on equilibrium technologies.
An expansion of offshoring opportunities—either at the extensive or the intensive
margin—encourages skill-biased technical change (henceforth, SBTC) by increas-
ing the relative price of high-skill products. Simultaneously, offshoring encourages
unskilled labor-biased technical change (henceforth, UBTC) because it expands
the market size of technologies complementary to unskilled workers, which can
now be used in the East. In the empirically more relevant case where the elasticity
of substitution between intermediates (tasks) is greater than the elasticity of sub-
stitution between skills and the extent of offshoring is limited initially, the price
effect dominates and greater offshoring opportunities induce SBTC.2 However,
when the level of offshoring is already high, the opposite pattern obtains and an
increase in offshoring opportunities induces UBTC, thus generating the inverse
U-shaped pattern mentioned above. This result hinges on the Ricardian features
of our model: first, the efficiency gains are strongest when offshoring is limited,
which implies a large wage gap between the West and the East. An expansion
in offshoring opportunities increases the demand for labor in the East and closes
this gap, reducing the efficiency gains from offshoring in the process. Second, by
closing the wage gap between industrialized and emerging economies, offshoring
mutes the price effect on the direction of technical change.
As an illustration of the different effects of offshoring, consider the example
of Apple products, such as the iPod, for which the overwhelming majority of
assembly and production jobs are offshored to the East (Linden et al. 2011).
2Here it is important to interpret offshoring broadly as taking place both in production tasks and
intermediates produced by unskilled workers, particularly because, as we discuss in Section 2, most of
the estimates on the relevant elasticity of substitution come from trade data on intermediates.
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Without offshoring opportunities, it may not have been profitable for Apple to
introduce some of the new varieties of iPods because of the higher labor costs
it would have faced. This would have likely reduced the demand for high-skill
engineering and design jobs at Apple, corresponding to the “price effect” which
creates a positive link between offshoring and SBTC. Counteracting this, absent
the offshoring opportunities, Apple may have designed iPods differently in order
to reduce its dependence on expensive domestic unskilled labor, implying a lower
demand for unskilled workers in the United States. This second channel illustrates
a potential negative link between offshoring and SBTC due to the “market size
effect”. 3
Although our model abstracts from important determinants of wage inequality
in the United States (including changes in the domestic supply of skills), it is
consistent with the qualitative picture emerging from several decades of changes
in the US wage structure. The first wave of offshoring in the 1980s coincides with
a sharp decline in the real wages of unskilled workers, but as offshoring continues
to expand in the late 1990s and 2000s, unskilled wages stabilize and begin rising
(e.g., Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Consistent with these facts, the impact of
offshoring on wage inequality is strongest in our model when the volume of trade
in intermediates is limited, as in the 1980s. As such, our results circumvent the
criticism to trade-based explanations of growing wage inequality that the volume
of trade between the United States and developing countries was then too small
to have a significant impact on wages.4
Our analysis of the transitional dynamics of technology and wages further shows
that the two activities are substitutes in the short run, but complements in the
long run. Following an expansion in offshoring opportunities, technical change
stops for a while because firms first spend resources to offshore the production
of existing intermediates. This is followed by a phase of either SBTC (for high
offshoring costs) or UBTC (for low offshoring costs). The distributional effects
of this transition can in principle harm workers in the West (especially unskilled
workers). Our welfare analysis shows that if the post-offshoring growth rate is
sufficiently high, all workers benefit from offshoring, but otherwise both skilled
and unskilled workers in the West world can lose out. Our quantitative results
suggest that while workers in the East gain unambiguously, in the West unskilled
workers are most likely to suffer as a result of offshoring, and skilled workers
typically obtain limited gains. Yet, all workers may gain if offshoring costs become
sufficiently low to trigger UBTC.
In extensions, we further show that when skilled intermediates can also be
offshored to the East, an increase in offshoring opportunities tends to increase
3See Acemoglu (2002) on the price and market size effects on the direction of technical change.
4Our model is also broadly consistent both with Bloom et al. (2011), who find that the surge
of imports from China from the late 1990s encouraged investments in information technology across
European industries, and with Autor et al. (2013), who show that it also reduced the demand for labor
in US local economies heavily exposed to this import competition.
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wage inequality in all countries.5 Moreover, in the presence of a low-productivity
imitation technology, the theory predicts that the rise in offshoring opportunities
in emerging economies gives rise to only to limited wage growth in the East,
consistent with the evidence that the rapid GDP growth in China has not been
matched by an equal increase in local wages (especially among low-skill workers).
Our paper is related to a growing literature on offshoring. Even though our
main results hinge on the endogenous reaction of technical change, our model of
offshoring with fixed technology has implications for the skill premium that are
related to, but different from, those emphasized in the literature. In particular,
offshoring tends to increase the skill premium through a labor supply effect and
a relative price effect, and tends to reduce it through the efficiency effect. This
efficiency effect is based on the complementarity between Western and Eastern
workers and is similar to the efficiency effect in Rodriguez-Clare (2010). It is also
related to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) productivity effect, but with
the crucial difference that it is more pronounced when there is little offshoring
(and thus a large wage gap between the West and the East) and it vanishes as
offshoring increases.6 Our main point of departure from the offshoring literature
is the introduction of directed technical change.7
Our paper also builds on models of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu
1998, 2002 and 2007; Kiley 1999; Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001; Gancia and Zili-
botti 2009), and especially those linking international trade to the direction of
innovation, including Acemoglu (2003), Thoenig and Verdier (2003), Epifani and
Gancia (2008), and Gancia, Mu¨ller and Zilibotti (2011). All of these papers show
how international trade can induce technological changes that further increase
the demand for skills, thus amplifying its direct impact on the wage structure.
This literature has not, to the best of our knowledge, considered offshoring, which
has different effects on incentives for technical change. These effects include the
impact of offshoring on the direction of technical change that is independent of
international intellectual property rights enforcement;8 and the non-monotonic
5This happens because, despite the presence of complete specialization and technological differences
across countries, the zero-profit condition for innovation implies conditional factor price equalization: if
offshoring costs are identical, profit maximization implies that the skill premium must be the same in the
West and in the East. See Sheng and Yang (2012) for supporting evidence, indicating that processing
(offshoring-related) exports and FDI explain a large fraction of the recent increase in the Chinese college
wage premium. See also Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for a different mechanism via which offshoring can
increase skill premia in all countries.
6The nature of this efficiency effect is independent of whether the expansion of offshoring opportunities
are at the intensive margin (as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg) or at the extensive margin (as in
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014).
7Recent contributions studying the effect of offshoring on wages include Antra`s et al. (2006), Burstein
and Vogel (2012), Costinot et al. (2013), Egger et al.(2013), and Goel (2013) . Other studies endogenize
the rate, but not the direction, of technical change in the economy in the presence of offshoring (see
Glass and Saggi 2001; Naghavi and Ottaviano 2009; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 2010; Rodriguez-Clare
2010; Branstetter and Saggi 2011; Jakobsson and Segerstrom 2012).
8In Acemoglu (2003), trade induces skill-biased technical change when intellectual property rights
(IPR) are not enforced internationally, but induces unskilled-labor biased technical change when they
are fully enforced. Here because offshoring is voluntary, and thus profitable, its qualitative impact on
the direction of technical change is independent of international IPR enforcement. Chu et al. (2014)
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relationship between offshoring and the direction of technical change, which cru-
cially depends on the endogeneity of the gap between wages in the West and the
East, and thus the extent of the price effect, features related to the Ricardian
nature of offshoring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents our basic
model of intermediate/task trade and directed technical change and characterizes
the effects of offshoring on wages and skill premia for a given level of technology.
Section II contains our main results on the impact of offshoring on the direction of
technical change, wages and welfare of different workers. Section III extends the
model to include offshoring of high-skill intermediates and technological imitation.
Section IV concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of all propositions and
some technical analysis omitted in the text.
I. Model
In this section, we present our baseline environment and characterize the impact
of offshoring on wages holding technology constant and treating offshoring as
exogenous. Both technology and the level of offshoring will be endogenized in the
next section.
A. Environment
The world economy comprises two countries, West and East, populated by two
types of workers, skilled and unskilled, in fixed supply.9 The West is endowed
with Lw units of unskilled workers and Hw units of skilled workers. The East is
assumed to be skill scarce. In the benchmark model, we assume that the East has
Le unskilled workers and no skilled workers. We do so to focus on the simplest
(and empirically more relevant) case in which offshoring affects low-skill jobs, but
we relax this assumption in Section III. The two countries also differ in their
technological capabilities: new technologies (intermediates) are introduced in the
West and can be transferred to the East only after paying a fixed offshoring cost.
As in earlier models of directed technical change (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti
2001; Acemoglu 2002), some technologies complement skilled workers while others
complement unskilled workers and the evolution of both is endogenous. There
are no barriers to trade of goods across countries, but labor is immobile. Trade
is driven both by differences in relative factor endowments, as in the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, and by differences in technological capabilities, as in Ricardian
models.
Infinitely-lived households derive utility from the consumption of a unique final
good, and supply labor inelastically. Preferences are identical across countries
study the effect of changes in the supply of labor in China on the direction of innovation in a model with
offshoring. Their results are similar to those obtained in models with directed technical change under
international IPR protection.
9We use the terms high-skill and skilled, and low-skill and unskilled, interchangeably.
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and workers. Consequently, the world economy admits a representative household
with preferences at time t = 0 given by
U0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnCtdt,
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate. Logarithmic utility is assumed for simplicity,
and time indexes will be omitted as long as this causes no confusion.
The final good, Y, is used for both consumption and investment, and is produced
by combining a low-skill and a high-skill good, Yl and Yh, with a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES):10
(1) Y =
(
Y
−1

l + Y
−1

h
) 
−1
,
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between Yl and Yh. We choose the
price of the final good, Y , as the numeraire and define as Pl and Ph the world
prices of Yl and Yh, respectively.
The low-skill and high-skill goods are produced from low-skill and high-skill
intermediates, also with a CES technology:
(2) Yl = El
(∫ Al
0
xαl,idi
)1/α
and Yh = Eh
(∫ Ah
0
xαh,idi
)1/α
,
where xl,i is the quantity of low-skill intermediate i ∈ [0, Al], xh,i is the quantity
of high-skill intermediate i ∈ [0, Ah], and σ ≡ 1/ (1− α) > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution. As in models of horizontal innovation (e.g., Romer 1990; see
Gancia and Zilibotti 2005 for a survey), the measures of intermediates, Al and
Ah, represent the state of technology in the two sectors which grows endogenously
over time. The terms
(3) El ≡ (Al)
2α−1
α and Eh ≡ (Ah)
2α−1
α
are technological spillovers introduced to guarantee that the model has balanced
growth properties for any σ.11 We denote pl,i (ph,i) the price of the intermediate
variety i, where i ∈ [0, Al] (i ∈ [0, Ah]).
Each intermediate variety is produced by a single monopolist, either in the West
or in the East, using labor. Introducing a new intermediate (either a high-skill or a
low-skill variety) requires a sunk innovation cost of µ units of the numeraire. Upon
10We suppress the distribution parameter of the CES to simplify notation.
11Alternative formulations without such spillovers yield identical results, but complicate the algebra,
motivating our choice here. See Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) and Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2012)
for a more detailed discussion of this formulation.
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paying µ, the innovator is granted the exclusive right to produce the intermediate
in the West. In addition, by paying an additional one-time setup cost of f units
of the numeraire, an intermediate firm can offshore production to a partner firm
in the East.12 We denote by κ the fraction of unskilled intermediates offshored
to the East, which corresponds to the extensive margin of offshoring.
A firm producing one unit of xh,i requires 1/Z (≤ 1) skilled workers. A firm
producing one unit of xl,i in the West requires one unskilled worker. A firm pro-
ducing one unit of xl,i in the East requires τ ≥ 1 unskilled worker. The parameter
τ captures the higher unit-labor requirement of offshoring due to, for instance,
coordination and communication costs (e.g., Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008
and 2012).13 Holding constant κ, declines in τ will expand offshoring at the in-
tensive margin.
We maintain throughout the paper that κ < κ¯ ≡ Le/(Le + τLw) < 1. This
guarantees that equilibrium wages are lower in the East than in the West, and
also ensures that intermediates that are offshored will not be produced in the
West. Consequently, in equilibrium, a measure κAl of unskilled intermediates will
be produced in the East and the remaining (1− κ)Al in the West. In what
follows, we are mostly interested in studying the effect of changes in the costs
of offshoring, parametrized by f and τ , especially through their impact on the
skill-bias of technology, Ah/Al. However, as a preliminary step to understand the
determinants of production and wages, we solve the model for given Al, Ah, and
κ.
B. Production and Wages with Exogenous Technology and Offshoring
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium for a given state of technol-
ogy, Al and Ah, and for a given level of offshoring, κ. This sets the stage for the
dynamic model of section II in which Al, Ah, and κ will be endogenized. We show
that, if technology is held constant, for plausible parameter values an exogenous
expansion in offshoring (κ) increases the skill premium, increases the real wage
of skilled workers in the West, and that of unskilled workers in the East, whereas
it can reduce the real wage of unskilled workers in the West.
The quantity produced of any intermediate variety in the West and the East
can be obtained by imposing labor market clearing as
(4) xh =
ZHw
Ah
, xl,w =
Lw
(1− κ)Al and xl,e =
Le
τκAl
.
12In the working paper version, we also allowed for contractual frictions, such as imperfect IPR protec-
tion, lowering the profit share appropriated by offshored firms (e.g., Antras, 2005). The effect of changes
in these contractual frictions is similar to changes in f and is omitted to save space.
13The main insights of our analysis can be captured by setting τ = 1. However, allowing τ > 1 is
useful both for comparison with Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and for additional comparative
static results.
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Next, we can solve for the East-West unskilled wage gap:
(5)
wl,w
wl,e
= τ
pl,w
pl,e
= τ
(
xl,e
xl,w
)1−α
= τ
(
Le
Lw
1− κ
τκ
)1−α
,
where the first equality follows from constant markups, the second from the de-
mand for xl,e and xl,w derived from (2) and the third uses (4). From (5), it is easy
to verify that κ < κ¯ implies that wl,w > τwl,e: i.e., the cost of production is lower
in the East. If more firms relocate production to the East (i.e., κ goes up), the
demand for unskilled workers falls in the West and increases in the East, thereby
compressing the wage gap. At κ = κ¯, there is “conditional factor price equal-
ization”: the lower wage in the East just offsets the lower productivity of labor
(wl,w = τwl,e). Note also that, holding κ constant, the elasticity of substitution
between unskilled workers in the West and East is σ ≡ 1/ (1− α).
Substituting (4) into (2), and using (3), the world production of the low-skill
good can be expressed as:
(6) Yl = AlLˆ,
where
(7) Lˆ ≡
(
κ1−α (Le/τ)α + (1− κ)1−α Lαw
)1/α
is a weighted average of the East’s and the West’s endowments of unskilled work-
ers, with weighs depending on the level of offshoring, κ. As in standard models
of horizontal innovation, equation (6) shows that production increases linearly
in the number of existing varieties, Al. More interestingly, for a given number of
varieties, equation (7) shows that production increases in the extent of offshoring:
∂Lˆ
∂κ
=
1− α
α
Lˆ1−α
[(
Le
τκ
)α
−
(
Lw
1− κ
)α]
> 0,
with limκ→0 ∂Lˆ/∂κ =∞ and limκ→κ¯ ∂Lˆ/∂κ = 0. We refer to this as the efficiency
effect of offshoring: an increase in κ induces an efficiency-enhancing reallocation
of production towards countries where wages are lower.14 In terms of equation
(6), the increase in κ is equivalent to an increase in the world factor endowment—
rising from Lˆ = Lw (when κ→ 0) to Lˆ = Lw +Le/τ (when κ→ κ¯). Importantly,
the efficiency effect is stronger when wages in the East are lower, i.e., when there is
14This effect is similar to the efficiency effect emphasized in Rodriguez-Clare (2010), from which we
take the name. There is also a similarity with models of imperfect international factor mobility (e.g.,
Gourinchas and Jeanne 2006). Here, the imperfectly mobile factor is knowledge, and offshoring is a form
of technology transfer, but naturally differences in knowledge imply differences in technologies across
countries as in Ricardian models of trade.
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little offshoring (low κ); when the East has a large relative endowment of unskilled
workers (high Le/Lw); and the unit cost of offshoring, τ , is low. This is intuitive
in view of the fact that the efficiency effect exploits the wage gap between East
and West, which is inversely related to κ and Lw/Le, and that higher τ reduces
the possible gains from offshoring. A fall in the unit cost of offshoring, τ , also
increases production of the low-skill good. In this case, the magnitude of the
effect is proportional to the extent of offshoring, κ.15
We now study the determinants of wages in the West. We consider, first, the
effect of changes in κ and τ on the skill premium, and then on wage levels.
Denote the skill premium in the West by ωw ≡ wh,w/wl,w. Constant markups
imply that ωw = Z (ph,w/pl,w). As shown in the Appendix, the skill premium can
be expressed as:
ωw = Z
(
Eh
El
)α Ph
Pl
(
Yh
Yl
xl,w
xh,w
)1−α
=
(
ZAh
Al
)1−1/( Lw
1− κ
)1−α(Hw
Lˆ
)−1/ 1
Lˆ1−α
,(8)
where, recall, Lˆ is increasing in κ and decreasing in τ. The first equation shows
that the skill premium is increasing in the relative price (Ph/Pl) and the relative
aggregate demand (Yh/Yl) for high-skill products, and decreasing in relative firm
size (xh,w/xl,w). The second line shows that the impact of an increase in κ
(corresponding to an expansion of offshoring at the extensive margin) on the
skill premium can be decomposed into a labor supply effect, (Lw/ (1− κ))1−α, a
relative price effect, (Hw/Lˆ)
−1/, and an efficiency effect, Lˆα−1. The first two
effects increase the skill premium, whereas the third one reduces it.
We now discuss each of these three effects in detail. First, offshoring displaces
Western unskilled workers who must be rehired by the remaining domestic firms.
Holding prices (Ph/Pl) constant, this is analogous to an increase in the supply of
unskilled workers in the West, which in turn increases the skill premium. Second,
offshoring increases low-skill production, raising the relative price of the high-skill
goods. This relative price effect also increases the skill premium. Third, offshoring
raises the overall efficiency of low-skill production, expanding the relative demand
for unskilled workers also in the West. The effect is stronger when the comple-
mentarity between unskilled workers in the West and the East is greater (low α)
and when the initial level of offshoring (κ) is lower.
An inspection of (8) shows that the efficiency effect is dominated by the price
effect whenever σ >  (i.e., 1− α < 1/). That is, if the elasticity of substitution
between intermediates produced in the East and in the West (or between unskilled
workers in the East and in the West) is greater than the elasticity of substitution
between high- and low-skill goods, then offshoring necessarily increases the skill
15This effect is similar to the productivity effect in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
10 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
premium in the West. In the opposite case (σ <  or 1− α > 1/), the efficiency
effect dominates the price effect. Whether it also dominates the labor-supply
effect depends on the level of offshoring. Since limκ→0 ∂Lˆ/∂κ =∞, for low levels
of κ, the efficiency effect is so strong that offshoring raises the relative reward to
the offshored factor. For high levels of offshoring, however, only the labor-supply
effect remains (recall that limκ→κ¯ ∂Lˆ/∂κ = 0). The relationship between ωw and
κ in the two cases is depicted in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Consider, next, the intensive margin of offshoring (a fall in τ). By raising Lˆ, a
lower τ increases the skill premium in the West if σ > . The impact of a fall in
τ on the skill premium is opposite if σ < .16
Since a number of effects of offshoring vary depending on whether σ is larger
or smaller than , it is useful to identify the empirically plausible scenario. With
no offshoring (κ = 0), the parameter  corresponds to the aggregate short-run
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in the West hold-
ing constant technology. In a world with positive offshoring (κ > 0),  is still the
aggregate short-run elasticity holding constant κ and Le/τLw.
17 Available esti-
mates of this parameter are in the range [1.5, 2] (see Ciccone and Peri 2005, and
references therein). Ciccone and Peri (2005) also reports estimates for the United
States over the period 1950-70, when offshoring was negligible, and find a value
of 1.61. The parameter σ corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between
traded intermediates in the low-skill sector, which is difficult to observe directly.
Yet, given that two thirds of the volume of trade is in intermediate inputs, we can
gauge the magnitude of this parameter from estimates of substitutability across
traded varieties. The vast majority of these estimates are above 3 (see Hillberry
and Hummels 2012 for a survey) and tend to be higher in low-skill sectors (e.g.,
Broda and Weinstein 2006). This implies that σ >  > 1 is the empirically more
plausible case, although the opposite may well hold true in some specific indus-
tries. In addition, recalling that σ also corresponds to the short-run (constant κ)
elasticity of substitution between unskilled workers in the West and East, letting
σ >  amounts to assuming that unskilled workers in the West and in the East are
closer substitute than are skilled and unskilled workers. This seems a plausible
assumption. With this motivation, in the rest of the paper we focus on the case
16This result generalizes the “productivity effect” of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) by showing
how the strength of this mechanism depends on the elasticity of substitution between offshored and
non-offshored intermediates (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008 assumes no substitutability).
17To see this, note that, combining (7) and (8), ωw is proportional to(
Hw
Lw
)−1/ [(
κ1−α
(
Le
τLw
)α
+ (1− κ)1−α
)1/α]α+1/−1
.
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in which σ >  > 1. The analysis of the complementary case is presented in the
Appendix.
We now study the effect of offshoring on wage levels. It is easy to establish
that wages of both high-skill and Eastern workers increase unambiguously with
offshoring (see Proposition 1). The effect on the wage of low-skill workers in the
West is more complex. As shown in the Appendix, the low-skill wage in the West
is given by:
(9) wl,w = αPlAlLˆ
1−α
(
1− κ
Lw
)1−α
,
where Pl = (Y/Yl)
1/. The impact of κ and τ on wl,w can again be decomposed
into a price effect, an efficiency effect and a labor supply effect. The interpreta-
tion is related to the discussion above concerning the skill premium: offshoring
decreases the unskilled wage via both the price and labor supply effects, whereas
it increases wl,w via the efficiency effect.
Consider, first, the effect of an increase in κ. When the initial level of offshoring
is high (i.e., as κ → κ¯), both the price and the efficiency effects vanish, and off-
shoring reduces unskilled wages unambiguously. However, the effect of offshoring
is ambiguous for low initial level of κ. We show in the Appendix that an increase
in κ necessarily lowers wl,w when (i) σ >  and (ii)
(10)
AhZHw
AlLˆ
>
(

σ − 
) 
−1
.
The relationship between κ and the three wage levels is depicted in Figure 2 for
this case. Note that when either σ <  or condition (10) is reversed, the relation-
ship between offshoring and unskilled wage in the West is inverse U-shaped.
FIGURE 2 HERE
The effect of a change in τ is similar. A fall in the unit cost of offshoring
increases Lˆ with ambiguous effects on wl,w. In the Appendix (see proof of Propo-
sition 1), we also establish that a fall in τ lowers wl,w as long as condition (10) is
satisfied. When either σ <  or condition (10) is reversed, then a fall in the unit
cost of offshoring increases unskilled wages.
The following proposition summarizes the effects on wages of an exogenous
increase in offshoring when technology is held constant.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose σ >  > 1. With exogenous technology and off-
shoring, an increase in offshoring, parameterized by an increase in κ:
(i) increases the skill premium, ωw;
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(ii) increases the real wage of skilled workers in the West, wh,w, and the real wage
of unskilled workers in the East, wl,e;
(iii) decreases the real wage of unskilled workers in the West, wl,w, if (10) is
satisfied. If (10) is not satisfied, the effect of κ on wl,w is inverse U-shaped: it
increases wl,w for low initial values of κ, and decreases wl,w for high initial values
of κ.
II. Equilibrium with Endogenous Offshoring and Technology
In this section, we endogenize offshoring (κ) and technology (Ah and Al) in
the dynamic world equilibrium. We characterize the effect of a reduction in the
cost of offshoring on the extent of offshoring, the skill bias of technology and
the skill premium in the West (Proposition 3). Our main result is the inverse
U-shaped relationship between the equilibrium skill bias of technology and an
inverse measure of barriers to offshoring (Proposition 4). In particular, when
offshoring costs are initially large, a reduction in these costs induces SBTC and
increases the skill premium in the West. On the contrary, when offshoring costs
are initially already low, further reduction in such costs induces UBTC and (under
some parameter conditions) decreases the skill premium. In later subsections, we
also study the transitional dynamics of equilibria and present a brief quantitative
analysis to gauge the different welfare effects of lower costs of offshoring.
Recall that new intermediates are initially produced in the West, but by pay-
ing an additional set-up cost, f , Western firms have the option to offshore the
production of low-skill intermediates to a partner firm in the East. In addition,
firms in the West can also innovate to generate new varieties by paying a fixed
cost µ. The benefits of innovation and offshoring are the profit streams from
selling an intermediate. Let Vh be the value of a high-skill firm (i.e., a firm selling
a high-skill variety). The asset price equation must satisfy the usual Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
(11) rVh = pih + V˙h.
Consider, next, firms producing low-skill intermediates. We denote by V ol the
value of a firm that has already paid the offshoring cost, and by Vl the value of
a firm producing a low-skill intermediate in the West. These value functions are
determined by the following HJB equations:
rV ol = max{pil,w, pil,e}+ V˙ ol ,(12)
rVl = max{pil,w + V˙l, r(V ol − f)}.
The max operator in the first HJB equation captures the fact that the firm will
produce in the most profitable location. In any equilibrium with offshoring, it is
more profitable to produce in the East, i.e., pil,e > pil,w. The max operator in the
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second HJB equation captures the option for the non-offshoring firm to pay the
cost f, offshore its production, and change its value to V ol .
A. Balanced Growth Path
We consider first the balanced growth path equilibrium (BGP). Free-entry im-
plies that the value of introducing a new intermediate and the value of offshoring
the production of an existing intermediate cannot exceed their respective costs:
V ol −Vl ≤ f, Vl ≤ µ, and Vh ≤ µ. In a BGP with positive innovation and offshoring,
all free-entry conditions must hold as equalities:
(13) Vl = Vh = µ, and V
o
l = f + µ.
This set of free-entry conditions pins down the BGP interest rate:
(14) r =
pil,e − pil,w
f
=
pil,w
µ
=
pih
µ
.
The arbitrage conditions in (14) pin down the offshoring rate (κ) and the skill
bias of technology (Ah/Al). The resulting equilibrium values are summarized in
the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose σ >  > 1 and ρσµ < min {Lw, ZHw}. Let λ ≡
(f/µ + 1)−1 ∈ [0, 1] . Then, there exists a unique BGP in which the offshoring
rate is
(15) κ =
(
1 + λ−1/ατLw/Le
)−1
;
the relative technologies are
(16)
Ah
Al
= (ZHw)
−1 Lˆ1−+α
(
1− κ
Lw
)α
;
and consumption and output grow at the rate
(17) g =
1− α
µ
{[
Lˆ1−α
(
Lw + λ
1/αLeτ
−1
)α]−1
+ (ZHw)
−1
} 1
−1
− ρ > 0.
Consider the equilibrium offshoring rate and note that λ ≡ (f/µ + 1)−1 is an
inverse measure of the cost of offshoring production (or, identically, a measure
of offshoring opportunities), ranging from λ = 0 (prohibitive offshoring costs) to
λ = 1 (no offshoring cost). From equation (15), an increase in λ or a fall in τ
makes offshoring more profitable, thereby increasing κ. The effect of a change
in either λ or τ on the direction of technical change is more complex, as these
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parameters affect both κ and Lˆ in equation (16). For simplicity, in the rest of this
section we focus on the comparative statics of an increase in λ (stemming from
a fall in the fixed cost f) on the direction of technical change. A reduction in τ
has similar effects, as discussed in more details in the Appendix.
In general, the relationship between Ah/Al and λ is non-monotonic, being in-
creasing for high cost of offshoring (i.e., low initial λ) and decreasing for high cost
of offshoring (i.e., high initial λ). This is illustrated by Figure 3 which shows the
equilibrium relationship between the BGP level of Ah/Al and κ for two empir-
ically plausible values of σ, such that σ > . Different points on each schedule
correspond to different values of λ ranging between zero and unity. In particular,
λ = 0 implies κ = 0, while λ = 1 implies that κ = κ¯ on the horizontal axis. For
future reference, we denote by λˆ the value of λ that maximizes Ah/Al.
18
FIGURE 3 HERE
To understand the intuition behind the inverse U-shaped relationship between
λ and the skill bias of technology, it is useful to note that, as in the canonical
model of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu 2002), the relative value of
new innovations hinges on a price effect and on a market size effect. Recalling
that Vh/Vl = pih,w/pil,w, and using (4) and (8), we obtain
(18)
Vh
Vl
=
Ph
Pl︸︷︷︸
price effect
· ZHw
Lˆ1−α
(
Lw
1−κ
)α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
market size effect
=
(
AlLˆ
AhHw
)1/
︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
· ZHw
Lˆ1−α
(
Lw
1−κ
)α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
market size effect
.
The price effect is relatively standard. An increase in λ improves the allocation
of labor worldwide. The resulting increase in Lˆ pushes up the production of the
low-skill good, Yl, that in turn raises the relative price of the high-skill good and
the profitability of high-skill innovation. In contrast, the market size effect is
richer than in the canonical model, and comprises two effects. On the one hand,
as more tasks and sectors are offshored to the East, each low-skill intermediate
still produced in the West employs more workers and is produced in greater
quantity. We refer to this effect, captured by the term Lw/(1 − κ) in equation
in (18), as a direct market size effect. Here, the fall in κ induces UBTC. On the
other hand, the market size of low-skill technologies also depends, positively, on
κ and Le, through the term Lˆ
1−α. We refer to this effect as a complementary
market size effect. This effect hinges on the extent of the complementarity across
intermediates: as α → 1 (i.e., the intermediates are perfect substitutes), the
18Formally, λˆ = φ−1
(
(α2)/ ((1− + α) (1− α))), where
φ (λ) ≡ (Lˆ (λ))−α
(
(κ (λ))−α (Le/τ)α − (1− κ (λ))−α Lαw
)
(1− κ (λ)) is monotonically decreasing in λ.
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effective market size becomes independent of Lˆ. Conversely, when α is small (i.e.,
the intermediates are highly complementary) this effect becomes stronger. Note
that both the price effect and the complementary market size effect work entirely
through Lˆ. Under the assumption that 1/ (1− α) ≡ σ > , the price effect always
dominates the complementary market size effect, ensuring that an increase in Lˆ
necessarily enhances the profitability of skill-biased innovations.19
The inverse U-shaped pattern of Figure 3 stems from the fact that the price
effect (net of the complementary market size effect) is very large when λ→ 0 and
κ→ 0, and dominates the direct market size effect in the low-λ region. Thus, an
increase in λ yields an increase in offshoring and SBTC. However, the market size
effect dominates when λ is larger.20 Eventually, the price effect vanishes as κ→ κ¯,
while the direct market size effect remains. In this region, a reduction in λ leads
unambiguously to more offshoring and UBTC. In other words, when κ is small,
wages in the East are so low that the effect of more offshoring opportunities is a
large fall in the relative price of low-skill goods inducing SBTC. On the contrary,
when wages in the East are already high (i.e., high κ), the price effect is small so
that more offshoring opportunities induce UBTC.
It is useful to compare these results with those obtained in models of trade
and directed technical progress, such as Acemoglu (1998 and 2003), Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia, Mu¨ller and Zilibotti (2011). In those models,
equation (18) simplifies to Vh/Vl = (Ph/Pl) · (ZH/L). Moreover, innovation is
only carried out in the skill-rich West. When the West starts trading with the
East, H/L falls relative to autarky. If patents are not protected in the South, the
market size for new technologies does not change. Then, the only effect will be an
increase in the world price of high-skill products (Ph/Pl), which induces SBTC.
With global patent protection, the market size dominates the price effect and the
larger endowment of unskilled workers in the world economy induces UBTC. Our
model nests these two extreme scenarios and predicts an endogenous switch from
SBTC to UBTC as global economic integration proceeds. The reason is that the
relative strength of the price effect varies endogenously with the level of offshoring:
it dominates when wages in the East are low and the efficiency effect is strong,
but it disappears as more offshoring eliminates the cost differences between the
East and the West.
Next, consider the effect of offshoring on innovation and long-run growth. The
BGP growth rate (17) can be characterized by combining the Euler equation for
19We report the the results for σ <  in the Appendix.
20More formally, the BGP ratio of technologies, (16), is found by imposing the equal profit condition,
Vl = Vh, in equation (18). The effect of λ on the direction of technical change can be expressed as:
(19)
∂ ln (Ah/Al)
∂λ
=
[
(1− + α) ∂ ln Lˆ
∂κ
− α
1− κ
]
∂κ
∂λ
.
This derivative is positive for small values of λ (i.e., low κ), because ∂ ln Lˆ/∂κ→∞ as κ→ 0. However,
it changes sign and turns negative for higher values of λ (i.e., high κ), because ∂ ln Lˆ/∂κ→ 0 as κ→ κ¯.
A similar result can be proven concerning the comparative statics of τ .
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consumption, g = r − ρ, with the free-entry condition for innovation, r = pih/µ.
Since ∂Lˆ/∂λ > 0 and ∂Lˆ/∂τ < 0, (17) shows that an increase in offshoring
opportunities (i.e., higher λ or lower τ) increases the BGP growth rate by raising
overall profitability.
The next proposition summarizes the main effects of global economic integration
on technology discussed so far (proof in the text).
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose σ >  > 1 and ρσµ < min {Lw, ZHw}. In the BGP,
greater offshoring opportunities parameterized by an increase in λ:
(i) increase the offshoring rate, κ;
(ii) induce SBTC (higher Ah/Al) for low initial λ, and UBTC (lower Ah/Al) for
high initial λ;
(iii) increase the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the growth rate, g.
B. The Impact of Offshoring on Wages with Endogenous Technology
In this subsection, which contains the main results of the paper, we derive the
implications of an increase in offshoring opportunities for the skill premium in
the West when technical change is endogenous.
Substituting (16) into (8) yields the BGP skill premium:21
(20) ωw = Z
−1H−2w Lˆ
1−+α
(
Lw
1− κ
)1−α
.
The effect of offshoring on the skill premium is generally non-monotonic and
depends on  and α.22 For a range of low λ (inducing low offshoring), the ef-
ficiency effect working through an increase in Lˆ is the dominant force, and the
skill premium increases with λ for two reasons. The first is the static effect pre-
sented in the previous section. The second is that globalization induces SBTC.
For higher initial λ’s, however, the relationship may switch sign. More precisely,
if  > 1/α, then there exists a region of high λ such that the skill premium falls
as λ increases. In this case, the long-run relationship between ωw and λ is in-
verse U-shaped. Note that this outcome is more likely when the substitutability
21In the polar opposite cases of prohibitive offshoring costs (κ = 0) and zero offshoring costs (κ = κ¯),
the skill premium is a function of the relative endowment of skilled labor in the West and in the entire
world, respectively:
ωw |λ=0= Z−1
(
Hw
Lw
)−2
, ωw |λ=1= Z−1
(
Hw
Lw + Leτ−1
)−2
.
As in standard models of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu, 1998, 2002), the relationship between
the skill premium and the relative supply of skill is increasing whenever  > 2.
22This can be seen more formally by differentiating (20) with respect to λ:
∂ lnωw
∂λ
=
[
(1− + α) ∂ ln Lˆ
∂κ
+
1− α
1− κ
]
∂κ
∂λ
.
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between low-skill intermediates is high. If σ = 5, the inverted U shape holds for
 ∈ (1.25, 5), which includes the range of consensus estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between skill groups.
The solid line in Figure 4 shows the relationship between the skill premium
and the offshoring rate (κ) for  = 1.6 and σ = 3.33. As before, each point on
the solid line corresponds to a different λ ranging between zero to one, so that
κ = (1 + λ−1/ατLw/Le)−1 moves from zero to κ¯ on the horizontal axis. For
comparison, we also report a dashed line showing how the skill premium would
have evolved if the technology had remained constant at the autarky level. As
the figure illustrates, the endogenous reaction of technology provides a strong
amplification of the impact of offshoring on the skill premium for relatively low
levels of integration, while this effect is reverted for high levels of offshoring.23
Thus, the combination of offshoring with directed technical change can explain a
large surge in the skill premium even for low levels of offshoring (and hence trade)
between the West and the East. Note also that the non-monotonic relationship
is entirely driven by the endogenous response of technology.
FIGURE 4 HERE
The next proposition summarizes the effects of offshoring on wages once the
endogenous response of technology is factored in:
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose σ >  > 1 and ρσµ < min {Lw, ZHw}. In the BGP,
greater offshoring opportunities parameterized by an increase in λ:
(i) reduce the wage gap between unskilled workers in the East and in the West,
wl,e/wl,w;
(ii) raise the skill premium in the West, ωw, if σ / (σ − 1) > ; if  > σ / (σ − 1),
they increase ωw for a region of low initial λ, and decrease ωw for a region of high
initial λ.
A fall in the unit cost of offshoring (τ) has similar effects as an increase in λ. As
shown in the Appendix, for low levels of λ (low κ) and σ > , a fall in τ increases
ωw. In contrast, starting from high levels of λ (high κ), a fall in τ decreases ωw
when  > 2. In the Appendix we also state the analogues of Propositions 2, 3
and 4 for the case of σ < . The main differences are that, in the low σ case,
an increase in offshoring opportunities necessarily induces UBTC, and generates
either a U-shaped response or a monotonically decreasing response in the skill
premium.
23The pattern presented in Figure 3 also suggests that the amplification effect would be even stronger
for higher, but still plausible, values of σ.
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C. Transitional Dynamics
The analysis of the previous two subsections has focused on the BGP predictions
of the theory. We now turn to the transitional dynamics. We focus on the effects
of a (small) unexpected increase in offshoring opportunities parametrized by an
increase in λ due to a fall in f, henceforth, an offshoring shock. This shock
increases the BGP offshoring rate, κ, and also affects the skill bias of technology
according to Proposition 3. The next proposition characterizes the transitional
dynamics of κ, Ah and Al.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that σ >  > 1, the economy is initially in a BGP,
and there is a positive offshoring shock (i.e., an increase in λ) at time t = 0.
Then, the dynamic equilibrium path converges in finite time to a new BGP with
a higher offshoring rate. Moreover:
(i) If λ < λˆ, then the offshoring shock induces a two-stage transition whereby,
for some T and T˜ such that 0 < T < T˜ < ∞, we have: (stage 1) κ˙t > 0,
A˙l,t = A˙h,t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]; (stage 2, SBTC) κ˙t > 0, A˙h,t > 0, and A˙l,t = 0
for all t ∈ [T, T˜ ]. The economy reaches the new BGP at t = T˜ . In the new BGP,
the technology is more skill biased (i.e., Ah/Al is higher) than in the initial BGP.
(ii) If λ > λˆ, then the offshoring shock induces a two-stage transition such that
for some T and T˜ (0 < T < T˜ <∞), we have: (stage 1) κ˙t > 0, A˙l,t = A˙h,t = 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ]; (stage 2, UBTC) κ˙t = 0, A˙h,t = 0, and A˙l,t > 0 for all t ∈ [T, T˜ ].
The economy attains the new BGP at t = T˜ . In the new BGP, the technology is
less skill biased (i.e., Ah/Al is lower) than in the initial BGP.
Upon impact, the increase in λ triggers a wave of offshoring investments. The
initial stage of the transition which goes on over the interval [0, T ] (stage 1) fea-
tures a continuous increase in κ (hence, V ol − Vl = f) but no innovation. The
intuition for why innovation is temporarily paused is that offshoring opportunities
cause a discrete increase in the interest rate. At this higher interest rate, inno-
vation becomes unprofitable, i.e., Vh < µ and Vl < µ. Over time, the offshoring
rate increases, restoring ultimately the profitability of innovation in either high-
or low-skill industries.
Which type of innovation is restored first depends on the initial level of λ. If
λ was initially low, the shock triggers SBTC.24 More formally, for low λ’s, the
second stage of the transition is characterized by the conditions V ol − Vl = f,
Vh = µ and Vl < µ. Thus, there is both offshoring and high-skill innovation, but
no low-skill innovation. Over time, the price adjustment reduces the gap between
pih and pil, and restores low-skill innovation incentives and the economy eventually
attains the new BGP. In contrast, if λ was initially high, the shock triggers UBTC
in the second stage of the transition (V ol − Vl = f, Vl = µ and Vh < µ). Note
24The proposition discusses the effect of small changes in λ. With larger changes in λ, greater care is
necessary; starting from λ < λˆ, a large increase in λ could take the economy above λˆ and have ambiguous
effects.
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that in this case κ reaches the new BGP level already at the end of the first stage
of the transition. During stage 2, offshoring continues but the offshoring rate, κ,
remains constant.
FIGURE 5 HERE
The changes in offshoring and technology affect wages in the West and the East.
Figure 5 shows the transitional dynamics of wages in two cases corresponding to
a low (Panel a) and a high (Panel b) initial λ, respectively.25 In particular,
it shows how the wages of the different types of workers (from top to bottom,
high- and low-skill in the West, and low-skill workers in the East) evolve over
time during the transition relative to the counterfactual wage dynamics under
no shock (dashed lines). In both cases, the high-skill wage is higher than in the
no-shock baseline throughout the whole transition, and the low-skill wage in the
West exhibits U-shaped dynamics. In Panel a (SBTC), the low-skill wage remains
below the no-shock counterfactual throughout the whole transition. In Panel b
(UBTC), it surpasses the no-shock counterfactual at the end of the transition. In
both cases, the offshoring shock causes large wage gains in the East.
In all cases, the new BGP has a higher growth rate, implying that all workers
will earn higher wages in a sufficiently far future. Consequently, low-skill workers
in the West face a trade-off between short-run wage losses and long-run wage
gains. The welfare consequences of the increase in offshoring and the resolution
of this trade-off are discussed in the next section.
D. Quantitative Analysis
In this subsection, we undertake a quantitative analysis to shed further light
on two aspects of our theory. Our analysis shows that the SBTC induced by (the
reductions in the cost of) offshoring contributes to the increase in inequality in
the West, but is silent on whether this indirect effect could be of the same order
of magnitude as the direct impact of offshoring. This is the first objective of
our quantitative analysis. Secondly, our theoretical implications are ambiguous
on welfare effects—even low-skill workers in the West could be in principle made
better off by lower costs of offshoring. Our aim is not to provide a detailed
calibration, but to gauge the implications of our theory for these two questions
under reasonable parameter values.26
We set the parameters so as to enable the model to match some salient facts
of the global economy in the year 2000. We identify the West with the United
25The parameter choices for these figures are discussed in the next section.
26See Arkolakis et al. (2013), Di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Tintelnot (2014) for detailed quantitative
analyses of models of international trade with multinational production, but without the endogenous
technology channel studied here (and without the analytical characterization permitted by our frame-
work).
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States and the East with China. We normalize the size of the unskilled labor
in the West to Lw = 1. The labor force of China is set to Le = 4.7, to match
the relative size of the Chinese urban labor force.27 We set Hw = 1.2 so as to
match the relative skill endowment (as measured by the share of workers with
college degree or more) in the United States. We choose the short-run elasticity
of substitution between high- and low-skill workers as  = 1.6, consistent with the
estimates by Ciccone and Peri (2005).28 Since most studies find the elasticity of
substitution between traded goods to be greater than 3, we set σ = 3.33.29 We set
ρ = 0.04 which, when combined with a 2% growth rate, implies a rate of return
on equity of 6%. The innovation cost, µ, is chosen to yield a pre-shock annual
BGP growth rate of 2%. Motivated by the recent slowdown in the world growth
rates, we also consider an alternative low-growth scenario where µ is consistent
with a 1% annual growth rate, close to the average of the US economy between
1995 and 2010. We set τ = 1.5. This choice is somewhat arbitrary, but the results
are not very sensitive to this parameter.30 Finally, the parameters λ and Z are
set to match, respectively, the PPP-adjusted wage gap between Chinese and low-
skill US workers, wl,e/wl,w = 0.16, and the skill premium in the US, ωw = 1.9,
in 2000.31 Given that in the model Chinese workers can only be employed in
offshored firms, κ should be interpreted not simply as the extent of offshoring,
but as a broad measure of technologies imported from the world to the Chinese
economy.
We first explore the effects of integration between the United States and China
on the BGP skill premium. We find that, if factor endowments were kept con-
stant, the US skill premium in autarky (λ = 0) would be 1.26, instead of 1.9.
Thus, integration with China accounts for an increase in the skill premium by
approximately 50%. Of this effect, around 60% is explained by the static forces
discussed in Section 2.2, while the remaining 40% is driven by SBTC. This result
thus suggests that the indirect effects of (the reductions in the cost of) offshoring
on wage inequality in the West working through technology are roughly of the
same order of magnitude as its direct effects.
Next, we assume the economy to be in a BGP in 2000 and study the effects of
an “offshoring shock,” captured by a fall in the fixed cost of offshoring, f . We set
27The average size of the unskilled US labor force is 61 million. This is derived from the total number
of non-agricultural workers in the US, which is 135 million (source: Current Population Survey). Of
these, 61 million are classified as unskilled (“high school graduates or less”) and 74 million are classified
as skilled (“some college or more”) workers. The average number of urban workers in China over the last
decade is 286 million (source: China Statistial Yearbook).
28Keeping Lw/Le constant,  = 1.6 implies a long-run elasticity—meaning an elasticity allowing for
the endogenous technology adjustment—of 2.5.
29We view this as a conservative benchmark as higher values of σ tend to increase the magnitude of
the welfare effects. In fact, in the working paper version, we show that with σ = 5, the main qualitative
implications are similar but welfare effects are somewhat larger.
30For instance, in the working paper version, we show that setting τ = 1 yields similar results.
31The wage gap is calculated using the ratio between the average US wage and the average urban
wage in China (from the China Statistical Yearbook). This is adjusted to yield the ratio between the
average Chinese urban wage and the US low-skill wage (own calculation). The PPP is from the Penn
World Table. The US skill premium is from Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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the size of the offshoring shock so as to generate changes in the volume of trade
broadly consistent with the data. During the period 2000-08, imports plus export
as a share of GDP in the US economy increased by 19% (Penn World Tables 7.1)
and trade in intermediates increased by around 25% (Feenstra and Jensen 2012).
We therefore choose the fall in f to obtain a 20% increase in the volume of US
trade. Since the volume of trade depends on income differences, the shock maps
directly into the US-China wage gap: as a consequence, the wages of Chinese
workers relative to US unskilled workers grow from the initial level of 0.16 to
0.21, which is almost half of the catch-up observed in the data. The resulting
transitional dynamics feature a pure offshoring stage followed by SBTC.
In Table 1, we report the effect of the offshoring shock on the growth rate (g),
on the US skill premium (ωw) and on welfare of all workers, expressed as the
equivalent change in their level of consumption in the old BGP (∆c∗h,w, ∆c
∗
l,w and
∆c∗l,e).
32 In column (1), we consider the benchmark 2% growth scenario, in which
offshoring increases the BGP growth rate of the world economy from 2% to 2.2%.
The shock has strong distributional effects: the US skill premium increases from
1.9 to 2.06. For comparison, this is about 80% of the variation in the demand
for skill observed during the period 2000-08.33 In welfare terms, Chinese workers
make large gains (26%), followed by the skilled workers in the US (8%). Unskilled
workers in the West also gain, but only a modest 1.3%.
In column (2), we consider the same experiment in the alternative low-growth
scenario where offshoring increases the BGP growth rate of the world economy
from 1% to 1.17%. In this case, all welfare gains are smaller and US unskilled
workers lose out. The fact that the gains are smaller when the growth in the
world economy is lower is a reflection of the long-run complementarity between
innovation and offshoring: offshoring increases the BGP growth rate, and in ad-
dition, a high innovation potential speeds up the transition so that the long-run
benefits from offshoring materialize faster.
The welfare results are partly driven by the effect of offshoring on growth.
Whether there is such a growth effect from offshoring is secondary to our the-
oretical focus. Our choice of the baseline model was motivated by theoretical
transparency. An alternative model that incorporates directed technical change
into a semi-endogenous growth model (without growth effects) along the lines of
Jones (1995) is outlined in Acemoglu (2002) and could be easily used as our basic
model without any significant implications for our main results—except that the
impact of offshoring on growth would be absent. Motivated by this, in column
(3), we neutralize the growth effect by changing simultaneously the cost of off-
32Welfare effects also depend on the initial asset distribution, which is difficult to observe. We therefore
assume that the initial share of world assets held by each group of workers is proportional to the present
value of their wages in the initial BGP.
33In our simulations, we keep Hw/Lw constant to avoid mixing different shocks. Over the period
2000-08, however, the US skill premium increased from 1.9 to 2 and the average educational attainment
has grown from Hw/Lw = 1.2 to 1.37. For comparison, our estimates of elasticities imply that, with
Hw/Lw remaining constant at 1.2, the skill premium would have reached ωw = 2.1.
22 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
shoring (f) and of innovation (µ) so as to keep the BGP growth rate constant
before and after the shock. This experiment allows us to isolate the redistributive
effects of technology, which is our main focus, while remaining agnostic on the
determinants of long-run growth. It also captures the essence of models of semi-
endogenous growth, as well as of models suggesting that offshoring may increase
innovation costs due to, for example, coordination problems (as in Naghavi and
Ottaviano 2009). The welfare gains of all agents are now smaller, and turn into
significant losses for the unskilled workers in the United States.
Finally, we study the effect of an offshoring shock starting from a smaller initial
wage gap between China and the US, a likely relevant scenario in the future. In
column (4), we change the initial offshoring cost so as to obtain a higher relative
wage in China, equal to 50% of the US unskilled wage. This corresponds to a
scenario where λ > λˆ, so that the offshoring cost induces UBTC. The size of the
offshoring shock is set to be such that it generates an increase in the Chinese wage
of 5 percentage points relative to the corresponding US level, as in the previous
experiments. As in column (3), we neutralize growth effects by changing the cost
of innovation so as to keep g = 2%. The fact that the offshoring shock induces
now UBTC has important distributional implications. In this case, the unskilled
workers in the United States make sizeable gains, even larger than those accruing
to the skilled workers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wl,e/wl,w |t=0 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.50
g0 2% 1% 2% 2%
gT˜ 2.2% 1.17% 2% 2%
ωw |t=T˜ 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.33
∆c∗h,w 8.04% 6.04% 3.32% 2.99%
∆c∗l,w 1.32% -0.28% -3.07% 3.99%
∆c∗l,e 26.38% 23.33% 20.81% 12.33%
Table 1—Welfare Effects, 2000-08
In conclusion, our quantitative analysis suggests that the welfare effects of off-
shoring are highly asymmetric and that low-skill workers in the West may lose
out. Our analysis also implies that fostering innovation can be important to
counteract the negative distributional effects, since losses are less likely in the
high-growth scenario. Finally, consistent with our theoretical results, the quan-
titative analysis shows that the adverse distributional effects of offshoring may
decrease, or even subside, as the technological gap between China and the West
declines. This is due to the main new result of our framework—the change in the
direction of technical change at different initial levels of offshoring.
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III. Extensions
We now extend our benchmark model in two directions. First, we allow for off-
shoring in high-skill intermediates/tasks. This extension shows how lower costs
of offshoring can lead to greater wage inequality both in the West and the East.
Second, we allow Eastern firms to transfer technology from the West also by imi-
tating Western technologies. This extension leads to a dynamic equilibrium path
in which the East can grow rapidly as it switches from the less efficient imitation
strategy to offshoring, and somewhat reminiscent of the Chinese experience over
the last two decades, this process can take place without wage growth.
A. High-Skill Offshoring
We now assume that the East is endowed with He units of skilled labor, but
maintain that the West is skill abundant: Hw/Lw > He/Le. For simplicity and
to save space, we restrict the analysis to the BGP and focus on the effects of λ
only.34 We also assume that the unit cost of offshoring (τ) is the same in both
sectors.
For given technology (Ah, Al) and offshoring rates (κh, κl), the skill premia in
the West and East are:
ωw =
(
ZAh
Al
)1−1/(Hˆ
Lˆ
)−1/(
Hˆ
Lˆ
)1−α(
Lw
Hw
1− κh
1− κl
)1−α
,
ωe =
(
ZAh
Al
)1−1/(Hˆ
Lˆ
)−1/(
Hˆ
Lˆ
)1−α(
Le
He
κh
κl
)1−α
,
where Hˆ ≡
(
κ1−αh (He/τ)
α + (1− κh)1−αHαw
)1/α
. The comparative statics of
changes in (κh, κl) follow directly from the baseline case.
More interesting results can be derived when offshoring is endogenous. We start
from the simpler case in which the fixed costs of offshoring are the same in the two
sectors. Then, the equilibrium offshoring rate is pinned down by the conditions
λpil,e = pil,w and λpih,e = pih,w. Substituting in the expressions of profits yields:
κl =
(
1 + τλ−1/αLw/Le
)−1
κh =
(
1 + τλ−1/αHw/He
)−1
.
Since the East is skill-scarce, it is easy to see that the relative extent of offshoring, κlκh ,
34The model with high-skill offshoring has an additional state variable, which makes a complete
characterization of transitional dynamics more cumbersome.
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declines monotonically from Hw/HeLw/Le to
1+τHw/He
1+τLw/Le
as λ increases. Interestingly, off-
shoring is endogenously more prevalent in the low-skill sector. This is intuitive:
the relative abundance of unskilled labor in the East induces Western firms to
offshore production relatively more in the unskilled sector. As λ increases, how-
ever, offshoring increases relatively more in the lagging skilled sector. This pattern
accords well with the available evidence.
Next, the indifference conditions between domestic and offshore production in
both sectors imply that the international wage gap in both sectors is given by:
wl,w
wl,e
=
wh,w
wh,e
= τλ
α−1
α .
An important implication is that the skill premium is the same in both countries:
offshoring generates conditional factor price equalization, even if the two countries
are fully specialized and have different technological capabilities. This result is
driven by the assumption that the cost of offshoring is the same in both sectors,
which in turn implies that the value of offshoring, which is proportional to the
East-West wage difference, must also be equalized. This is accomplished by a
higher offshoring rate in the unskilled sector, so as to increase the relative demand
and hence the wage for unskilled workers in the East.
The common BGP skill premium in the West and the East, ω = ωw = ωe, is
now:
ω = Z−1
(
Lˆ
Hˆ
)1−+α(
1− κh
1− κl
Lw
Hw
)1−α
= Z−1
(
Lˆ
Hˆ
)1−+α(
τLw + λ
1/αLe
τHw + λ1/αHe
)1−α
.
The fact that Hw/Lw > He/Le implies that an increase in λ raises both terms
in parenthesis. Intuitively, offshoring has a larger impact in the unskilled sector
because the East has a relatively larger endowment of unskilled workers. It follows
that the comparative statics in response to changes in λ are similar to the baseline
case. In particular, depending on the elasticities  and α, the relationship between
λ and ωw is still likely to be non-monotonic. Figure 6 plots the relationship
between ω and offshoring opportunities, λ, using the calibration of the previous
section. The graph shows both the previously studied case in which He = 0 (solid
line) and the case in which 10% of workers in the East are skilled (dashed line).
Clearly, adding high-skill offshoring does not change the qualitative relationship
between the skill premium in the West and offshoring: the shape of the two lines
is similar, with the only difference being that, with a larger skill-endowment in
the East, the effect of offshoring on the skill premium is smaller (the red line is
below the black line). Interestingly, for sufficiently low levels of offshoring, a fall
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in offshoring costs raises skill premia both in the origin and destination countries.
These predictions are broadly consistent with the evidence reported in Ge and
Yang (2014), who find that the college premium in China increased from around
1.3 in 1992 to more than 1.6 in 2007, and in Sheng and Yang (2012), who find that
processing exports and FDI can account for 75% of the increase in the Chinese
college wage premium between 2000 and 2006.
FIGURE 6 HERE
The results are easily generalized to the case in which offshoring costs are
different in the two sectors. In this case, the BGP skill premium would also
vary across locations. In particular, if the cost of offshoring was larger for high-
skill jobs (λh < λl), then there would be less H-offshoring, resulting in lower
demand for skilled workers in the East and a lower skill premium compared to the
West: ωe = ωw (λh/λl)
(1−α)/α . The generalized model can explain why, despite
its scarcity of skilled labor, the skill premium in China is lower than in the United
States and why it has increased in both countries.
B. Imitation, Trade and Offshoring
So far, the only mode of technology transfer from West to East has been off-
shoring. In this section, we add the possibility for local firms in the East to imi-
tate Western technologies. Imitation is modelled as an inferior form of technology
transfer: the labor productivity for producing an intermediate is lower with imita-
tion than under offshoring, for example because tacit knowledge of Western firms
prevents perfect imitation. However, imitation entails no payment of monopoly
rents to the innovating firms in the West. We show that in this environment,
two regimes emerge: as long as offshoring costs are sufficiently high, technology
transfer occurs only through imitation. However, when offshoring costs become
sufficiently low, offshoring starts prevailing and less productive local imitating
firms gradually disappear.
More specifically, we assume that Eastern firms can copy existing intermediates
at a small cost and become local monopolists. However, technology transfer
via imitation is imperfect: imitated intermediates are produced with a worse
technology, with labor productivity equal to ϕ < 1. There is free trade in final
goods, Yh and Yl. Intermediates can also be traded, but foreign trade entails a
small flow cost to be paid independently of the quantity exported. As a result,
trade in final goods will equalize prices in both countries and there will be no trade
in individual intermediates.35 To simplify, we focus on the case where τ = 1 and
35The assumption of (small) trade costs, which is quite realistic, avoids complications arising from
two producers being active in the same market. More formally, the equilibrium can be described by the
following game: there are two producers (Eastern and Western monopolist) of the same variety. The
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ϕ < α. Then, the monopoly price charged by a firm that offshores production
to the East is lower than the marginal cost of a local imitator. In this case,
offshoring, when it happens, drives imitated intermediates out of business.
Let us now start with the benchmark without offshoring (but with imitation).
Eastern firms imitate all intermediates and there is trade in Yh and Yl only. The
relative (world) price of these goods is:
(21)
Ph
Pl
=
(
Ah
Al
ZHw
Lw + ϕLe
)−1/
The skill bias of the technology is determined by the incentive to innovate in the
West. The relative profitability of skill-complementary technologies is:
Vh
Vl
=
pih,w
pil,w
=
PhZHw
PlLw
.
Along the BGP, all types of innovations must be equally profitable, thus Vh = Vl.
This condition combined with (21) yields BGP relative technologies as:
(22)
Ah
Al
=
(
ZHw
Lw
) Lw + ϕLe
ZHw
.
Intuitively, in a world with no offshoring, imitation affects the direction of tech-
nical progress in the West through the price effect—there is no market size effect
because of lack of IPR. Better imitations (higher ϕ) lead to greater production
of unskilled goods in the East and so to a higher relative price of skilled goods.
This induces SBTC.
Now consider a reduction in offshoring costs that makes offshoring profitable.
In this case, there is a switch from a BGP with only imitation to one with pure off-
shoring. To determine when this happens, note that offshoring will be profitable,
starting from a BGP without offshoring, when
(23)
piol,e − pil,w
r
≥ f,
where pil,w is the equilibrium profit in the West under no offshoring; r = pil,w/µ is
the corresponding BGP interest rate; and piol,e denotes the profit of an individual
Western firm that deviates from a no-offshoring equilibrium and offshores pro-
Eastern producer has a technlogical disadvantage, but this is perfectly offset in equilibrium by a lower
wage. The infinitesimal trade cost keeps the two markets segmented. The Eastern producer knows that,
if it paid the trade cost, it would enter a stage game in the Western market in which Bertrand competition
would drive profits to zero. The same argument keeps the Western producer from entering the Eastern
market. Therefore, in equilibrium, each producer serves the local market. See Acemoglu, Gancia and
Zilibotti (2012) for details.
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duction to the Eastern market. Such a deviating firm can pay Eastern workers a
wage that is only a fraction ϕ of the Western wage, and still access the state-of-
the-art technology. In view of this, condition (23) ensures that starting from the
BGP with only imitation, offshoring will be profitable. Substituting for profits,
(23) can be rewritten as ϕ ≤ λ 1−αα . When ϕ ≤ λ 1−αα , Western firms will find it
profitable to offshore to the East.
Let us now characterize the BGP that emerges after offshoring. The first im-
portant observation is that although in a BGP with offshoring only a fraction κ of
the intermediates are offshored, there will be no imitation in the remaining inter-
mediates. The reason is that all Eastern producers now face higher wages: though
without offshoring the technological disadvantage of Eastern producers was offset
by the lower wages in the East—enabling local producers with imitated technol-
ogy to be active in all markets—this is no longer the case with offshoring, and
thus low-productivity imitators in the East can no longer survive when Eastern
wages are pushed up due to offshoring. As a result, offshoring induces special-
ization: in the new BGP, the East will export the intermediates produced in the
offshored sectors to the West, and the West will produce and export to the East
the remaining intermediates. Inferior (imitated) technologies will be abandoned.
The transitional dynamics are interesting. Consider an increase in λ, which
initiates the transition from a BGP with only imitation to a BGP with offshoring.
We will first have a period of offshoring in which, as already discussed, there will
be no innovation. During this phase, offshoring will also push out low-productivity
imitating firms in the East. During this process, however, wages in the East do
not increase until all low-productivity (imitator) firms have exited the market.
Thus, equilibrium dynamics take the form of rapid growth accompanied by the
reallocation of workers from low-productivity firms to high-productivity firms
with no wage growth. The intuition for this result is related to Song et al. (2011).
The transitional dynamics enter their second phase when all low-productivity
imitators have exited and wages in the East start growing again. The rest of the
transition to the BGP is identical to the benchmark model. Whether the second
stage features SBTC or UBTC again depends on whether (16) is higher or lower
than (22) evaluated at ϕ > λ
1−α
α .
IV. Conclusions
Offshoring of jobs to low-wage countries and SBTC are among the most promi-
nent and fiercely debated trends of the US labor market. This paper has shown
how these two phenomena are likely to be interlinked— because of the impact of
offshoring on the direction of technical change.
Our theoretical analysis provides several new insights on these interlinkages.
Most importantly, we show that a decline in the cost of offshoring has in gen-
eral ambiguous effects on the level of wages, the skill premium and the direction
of technical change. Nevertheless, our analysis clearly identifies the contrasting
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effects and their relative magnitudes. In the most plausible scenario, starting
from a high cost of offshoring, a decline in offshoring costs triggers a transition
characterized initially by falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West and
followed by SBTC. These implications highlight why, in contrast to the conven-
tional wisdom, offshoring could have a major impact on wage inequality even
when—particularly when—the extent of trade and offshoring is limited. Interest-
ingly, despite leaving out several important determinants of wage inequality in
the United States, our model accords fairly well with the available evidence on
US labor market trends of the 1980s and early 1990s.
The implications of offshoring are very different, however, once its cost is suf-
ficiently low: in this case, because past offshoring has already contributed to a
narrowing of the wage gap between the West and the East, further offshoring will
induce unskilled-biased technical change and a lower skill premium. This sug-
gests that the future potential distributional effects of offshoring could be quite
different than its past impact. We also characterize the dynamics of wages and
technology after a fall in the cost of offshoring and the implication for welfare.
The tractable nature of our framework enables several extensions, two of which
we have discussed. First, we study offshoring of both low- and high-skilled inter-
mediates and find that, in contrast to the standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
globalization can lead to higher skill premia even in skill-scarce countries. Sec-
ond, we investigate the transition of the East from low-productivity imitation to
higher-productivity offshoring, which leads to a pattern of transition reminiscent
of the Chinese process of economic growth over the last three decades. Our model
could be further extended in several other directions, including by incorporating
a more realistic production structure with different types of labor and capital, in-
novation emanating from the East, and the possibility that offshored technologies
be copied by local producers in the East.
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Appendix
A1. Technical Analysis in Section 2
The representative household sets a consumption plan to maximize utility, sub-
ject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a no-Ponzi game condition. The
consumption plan satisfies a standard Euler equation, C˙t/Ct = rt − ρ, and a cor-
responding transversality condition, limt→∞
[
exp
(
− ∫ t0 rsds)Wt] = 0,where rt
is the interest rate, and Wt is the wealth of consumers which comes from their
ownership of firms in the economy.36
Profit maximization yields the following inverse demand functions for Yl and
Yh:
(A1) Pl = (Y/Yl)
1/ and Ph = (Y/Yh)
1/ ,
where Pl and Ph are the world prices of Yl and Yh, respectively. Similarly, we
obtain the inverse demand functions for varieties of intermediates:
(A2) pl,i = PlE
α
l Y
1−α
l x
α−1
l,i and ph,i = PhE
α
hY
1−α
h x
α−1
h,i ,
where pl,i (ph,i) is the price of the intermediate variety i, with i ∈ [0, Al] (i ∈
[0, Ah]).
Since the demand for each intermediate has a constant elasticity equal to σ ≡
1/ (1− α), profit maximizing firms charge prices equal to a markup 1/α over the
respective marginal cost: ph,i = (wh/Z) /α and pl,i = wl,w/α for intermediates
produced in the West, and pl,i = τwl,e/α for intermediates produced in the East.
Profits are therefore a fraction (1− α) of the value of sales and, using (2), (3),
(4) and (A2), they can be written as:
pih = (1− α)PhH, pil,w = (1− α)PlLˆ1−α
(
Lw
1− κ
)α
,(A3)
pil,e = (1− α)PlLˆ1−α
(
Le
τκ
)α
.
36In particular, we have
Wt =
(∫ Ah,t
0
Vj,tdi+
∫ Al,t
0
Vj,tdj
)
,
where Vj,t =
∫∞
t exp
[− ∫ st rs′ds′] pij,sds, pij,s is the profits of the firm operating intermediate j in sector
s ∈ {l, h} as given by (A2) below, and As,t is the range of active intermediates in sector s.
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Substituting the expression of xh given in (4) into (2), and using (3) yields:
(A4) Yh = AhZH.
To find the expression of the skill premium given in the text, (8), plug-in the
expressions in (A2) into ωw = Z (ph,w/pl,w) . Then, standard algebra using equa-
tions (3), (4), (6), (A1), and (A4) yields equation (8). Similarly, the expression
of the low-skill wage, (9), is found by substituting in the expression for pl,w in
(A2) into wl,w = αpl,w. Then, equation (9) can be obtained from equations (3)
and (4).
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
The effect of κ on ωw follows from (8) as discussed in the text. To establish the
effect of κ on wl,w, use Pl = (Y/Yl)
1/ and (6) into (9) to get:
wl,w = α
(
Y
Al
)1/
AlLˆ
1−α−1/
(
1− κ
Lw
)1−α
.
Differentiate this to obtain:
∂ lnwl,w
∂κ
= η
∂Lˆ
∂κ
− 1− α
1− κ ,
where η ≡ 1−α+(1−α−1/)(AhZHw/AlLˆ)
−1

Lˆ+Lˆ(AhZHw/AlLˆ)
−1

. As κ → κ¯, ∂Lˆ∂κ → 0. Hence, wl,w de-
creases unambiguously for large values of κ. Conversely, as κ → 0, ∂Lˆ∂κ → ∞.
Hence, the sign of the effect depends on the sign of η. Note that η is positive if
σ <  (i.e., 1− α > 1/). However, if σ >  (i.e., 1− α < 1/), then η is negative
provided that condition (10) is satisfied. Since limκ→0 Lˆ = Lw and using (8) and
σ ≡ 1/ (1− α), this condition can be rewritten as ωwHw/Lw > / (σ − ).
The real wages of other workers are wh,w = αZph,w and wl,e = αpl,e/τ . Using
(3), (4), (6), (A1), (A2) and (A4) yields:
wh,w = α
(
Y
AhZHw
) 1

ZAh, and
wl,e =
α
τ
(
Y
Al
) 1

AlLˆ
1−α−1/
(
κ
Le
)1−α
.
Both wh,w and wl,e are increasing in κ since
∂Y
∂κ > 0, and because Lˆ
1−α−1/κ1−α
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is increasing in κ.
To sign the effect of τ on wl,w, note that
∂ lnwl,w
∂τ = η
∂Lˆ
∂τ . Since
∂Lˆ
∂τ < 0, the
sign of the effect depends on the sign of η, hence, on condition (10), as discussed
above.
A3. Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting λ ≡ (f/µ + 1)−1 into (14) yields pil,w = λpil,e. Using (A3) and
solving for κ yields (15). To find the BGP value of Ah/Al, note that (14) requires
that pih = pil,w. Using (6), (A1), (A4) and (A3), and solving for Ah/Al, yields
(16). Finally, substituting (A3) into r = pih/µ and rearranging terms using (1),
(6), (15), (A1), and (A4) yields:
(A5) r =
1− α
µ
{[
Lˆ1−α
(
Lw + λ
1/αLeτ
−1
)α]−1
+ (ZHw)
−1
} 1
−1
.
Standard arguments imply that consumption, Y , Yh, Yl, Ah and Al all grow
at the common rate g = r − ρ, which is strictly positive provided that ρσµ <
min {Lw, ZHw}. Since in BGP, Vl = Vh = µ and V ol = µ + f (from (13)), the
transversality condition becomes
lim
t→∞
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rsds
)
(Ah,tµ+Al,t (µ+ κf))
]
= 0.
As Al and Ah grow at the rate g, and r = ρ+ g > g, this condition is satisfied in
the unique BGP.
A4. Proof of Proposition 4
The effect of λ on the skill premium along the BGP can be analyzed by differ-
entiating (20) with respect to λ:
(A6)
∂ lnωw
∂λ
=
[
(1− + α) ∂ ln Lˆ
∂κ
+
1− α
1− κ
]
∂κ
∂λ
.
Note that, as λ→ 0, then, κ→ 0 and ∂ ln Lˆ∂κ →∞. Thus, ∂ lnωw∂λ > 0 for sufficiently
low values of λ. As λ → 1, instead, κ → κ¯ and ∂ ln Lˆ∂κ → 0. Thus, for sufficiently
high values of λ, equation (A6) shows that ∂ lnωw∂λ has the same sign as (1− α).
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To study the effect of τ−1, substitute (7) and (15) into (20), and obtain:
∂ lnωw
∂τ−1
=
Leλ
1/α
α
[
1− + α
λLw + λ1/αLe/τ
− (− 1) (2α− 1)
Lw + λ1/αLe/τ
]
.
At λ = 0, the sign of this derivative depends on the sign of (1− + α). At λ = 1,
∂ lnωw
∂τ−1 =
−Le(−2)
Lw+Le/τ
. Finally, straightforward algebra shows that Lw+λ
1/αLe/τ
λLw+λ1/αLe/τ
is
decreasing in λ. Thus, ∂ lnωw
∂τ−1 can change sign at most once.
A5. Proof of Proposition 5
Preliminary results. —
LEMMA 1: Suppose there are no unanticipated shocks for all t ≥ s, and at
t = s, Vz = µ, with z = {h, l}. Then Vz = µ for all t > s. Similarly, if at t = s
we have V ol − Vl = f , then V ol − Vl = f for all t > s.
PROOF:
If Vz = µ at t = s, but Vz < µ later, then it would imply an anticipated capital
loss, violating (11) or (12).
LEMMA 2: The conditions Vl,= Vh = µ and V
o
l − Vl = f are both necessary
and sufficient for the economy to be in a BGP.
PROOF:
Vh = Vl = µ and V
o
l −Vl = f are simultaneously satisfied only for unique values
of κ, which in turn defines Ah/Al uniquely.
Define roff ≡ (λ˜pil,e − pil,w)/f , rh ≡ pih,w/µ, and rl ≡ pil,w/µ. Here roff is
the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive offshoring (it follows from
V ol − Vl = f); rh is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive technical
change in the skilled sector (it follows from Vh = µ); rl is the equilibrium interest
rate when there is positive technical change in the unskilled sector (it follows from
Vl = µ).
General characterization. — Given no uncertainty, no arbitrage implies that
r (Ah,t, Al,t, κt) = max {roff , rh, rl} . In a BGP, roff = rh = rl. The world equilib-
rium path can then be described by the following system of differential equations:
C˙t
Ct
= r (Ah,t, Al,t, κt)− ρ(A7)
µA˙h,t + (µ+ fκt) A˙l,t + fAl,tκ˙t = Y (Ah,t, Al,t, κt)− Ct(A8)
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with boundary conditions given by κ0, Ah,0 and Al,0 at t = 0 and a transversality
condition. Here C is the consumption of the world representative agent, and Y
is the world GDP, defined as
Y (Ah,t, Al,t, κt) =
1 +(Al,tLˆ (κt)
Ah,tZHw
) −1
ε


−1
Ah,tZHw,
where, recall, Lˆ (κt) =
[
κ1−αt (Le/τ)
α + (1− κt)1−α Lαw
]1/α
.
Consider now the impact effect of a (positive) offshoring shock. Since pil,e, pil,w
and pih,w (and, hence, rh and rl) are not affected by changes in f while roff
increases if f falls, then, upon the shock, the following condition must hold:
(A9) r (Ah,t, Al,t, κt) = roff > rh = rl.
Lemma 1 guarantees that offshoring never stops for t > 0. Thus, for all t > 0,
r (Ah,t, Al,t, κt) = roff , implying that
r (Ah,t, Al,t, κt) =
(
Y (Ah,t, Al,t, κt)
Al,0Lˆ (κt)
) 1
 (1− α)
f
(
Lˆ (κt)
)1−α(( Le
τκt
)α
−
(
Lw
1− κt
)α)
.
The first stage of the transition: pure offshoring. — In the first stage of
the transition, (A9) implies that V ol − Vl = f, Vh < µ and Vl < µ. Then, the
dynamic system, (A7)-(A8), simplifies to:
C˙t
Ct
= r (Ah,0, Al,0, κt)− ρ(A10)
fAl,0κ˙t = Y (Ah,0, Al,0, κt)− Ct(A11)
where κ0 is pinned down by the pre-shock BGP condition, κ0 =
(
1 + λ
−1/α
0 τLw/Le
)−1
.
The assumption that the economy starts from a BGP further implies that
Ah,0 = (ZHw)
−1
(
κ1−α0 (Le/τ)
α + (1− κ0)1−α Lαw
) 1−+α
α
(
Lw + λ
1/α
0 Le/τ
)−α
Al,0.
Thus, for given Al,0, Ah,0 is uniquely pinned down by the BGP requirement.
Next, we prove that the pure offshoring stage of the transition (roff > rh
and roff > rl) must end in finite time, restoring positive innovation. Suppose,
to obtain a contradiction, that this is not the case, so there is no innovation
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thereafter. First, we can rule out that (for any ε > 0) r (Ah,0, Al,0, κt) > ρ + ε
for all t. If this were true, Ct would grow unbounded, which contradicts the fact
that with no innovation Y (Ah,0, Al,0, κt) is bounded (recall, in particular, that
κt ≤ κ¯, so continuous growth without innovation is not possible). This implies
that, without innovation, the dynamic system must converge to a steady state
with zero growth and with r (Ah,0, Al,0, κ) = ρ. But rh,t > ρ throughout, since
rh,0 > ρ and rh is increasing in κ, which is itself increasing along the transition
path. This implies that at some point r (Ah,0, Al,0, κ) = rh,t, triggering skill-biased
innovations, and yielding a contradiction.
Next, we look at whether the stage of pure offshoring is followed by SBTC or
UBTC. Note that, during the pure offshoring stage of transition,
rl,t
rh,t
=
(
Ah,0
Al,0
) 1

(ZHw)
1−

(
Lˆ (κt)
)1−α− 1

(
Lw
1− κt
)α
.
In general, it is ambiguous whether rl/rh is increasing or decreasing in κ. However,
it is easy to establish that there exists κˆ ∈ (0, κ¯) such that (i) rl/rh is decreasing
in κ for κ < κˆ; (ii) rl/rh is increasing in κ for κ ≥ κˆ. This can be seen from the
derivative:
∂ ln (rl/rh)
∂κ
=
(
1− α− 1

)
∂ ln Lˆ
∂κ
+
α
1− κ.
By assumption, 1 − α − 1/ < 0. Then, the result follows from the fact that
∂ ln Lˆ/∂κ decreases monotonically from ∞ at κ → 0 to 0 at κ → κ¯. In case (i),
the pure offshoring stage is followed by a stage of the transition in which the
equilibrium features offshoring and SBTC (V ol − Vl = f, Vh = µ and Vl < µ). In
case (ii), the stage of pure offshoring is followed by a stage in which the equilibrium
features offshoring and UBTC (V ol −Vl = f, Vl = µ and Vh < µ). The convergence
to the new BGP must be studied separately for each of the two cases.
Second stage of the transition: offshoring+factor biased technical change.
—
Case 1: SBTC (κ < κˆ). — We start by pinning down the offshoring rate, κSBTC ,
that triggers a switch from pure offshoring to SBTC+offshoring (κ˙t > 0, A˙h,t > 0
and A˙l,t = 0). κ
SBTC is implicitly determined by the condition roff = rh, which
can be rewritten as
Ah,0
Al,0
=
Lˆ
(
κSBTC
)1−+α
(ZHw)
1−
[(
Le
τκSBTC
)α
−
(
Lw
1− κSBTC
)α]−(f
µ
)
.
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As proven above, κt will attain κ
SBTC in finite time. Let T > 0 denote the time
in which SBTC+offshoring starts (κT = κ
SBTC). Note that T can be determined
by numerical integration. For all t ≥ T , the condition roff = rh must hold, and
this yields
(A12) Ah,t = Ah (κt) =
Lˆ (κt)
1−+α
(ZHw)
1−
[(
Le
τκt
)α
−
(
Lw
1− κt
)α]−(f
µ
)
Al,0.
The equilibrium dynamics can therefore be expressed as:
C˙t
Ct
= r (Ah (κt) , Al,0, κt)− ρ,(A13) (
µ
∂Ah (κt)
∂κt
+ fAl,0
)
κ˙t = Y (Ah (κt) , Al,0, κt)− Ct,(A14)
for t ≥ T, with the initial condition κT = κSBTC . Note that equation (A12) allows
us to reduce the number of state variables in the dynamic system to one.
Next, we show that low-skill innovation is restored in finite time. Suppose, to
obtain a contradiction, that the SBTC+offshoring stage never ends. Since κ ≤ κ¯,
(A12) implies that Ah (κt) and Y (Ah (κt) , Al,0, κt) are bounded. Thus, the same
argument used to prove that the stage of pure offshoring must end in finite time
can be used to establish that (i) if the transition featuring SBTC+offshoring
continued forever, then r (Ah (κt) , Al,0, κt) would fall to ρ, and the economy would
attain a steady state with zero growth; (ii) in converging to a steady state with
zero growth, r would decline sufficiently to trigger UBTC, yielding a contradiction.
In summary, the argument above establishes that there exists T˜ <∞ such that,
for t ≥ T˜ , V ol −Vl = f, Vh = Vl = µ, and the economy attains the new BGP. Using
the terminal condition κT˜ =
(
1 + λ−1/ατLw/Le
)−1
(where λ is the after-shock
index) together with (A13)–(A14) yields the time for switch T˜ .
Case 2: UBTC (κ ≥ κˆ). — In this case, the conditions V ol − Vl = f and Vl = µ
must hold simultaneously, i.e., roff = rl. But because this is the condition that
determines the BGP level of offshoring, in this stage κ must be at its (after-shock)
BGP level (15). Since (15) only depends on exogenous parameters, in this stage
there is offshoring, but κ remains constant over time. The system of equations
characterizing equilibrium simplifies then to
C˙t
Ct
= r (Ah,0, Al,t, κ)− ρ,(A15)
(µ+ fκ) A˙l,t = Y (Ah,0, Al,t, κ)− Ct.(A16)
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This is a system of autonomous differential equations in Ct and Al,t, with the
initial condition Al,T = Al,0. It is straightforward to show, as in case 1, that this
transition cannot go forever, since the technology features decreasing returns to
Al,t (holding constant κ and Ah), and thus r would fall to ρ. However, this is
impossible, and thus innovation in the skilled sector is restored in finite time. In
fact, skill-biased innovation is restored as soon as rl = rh. This occurs at t = T˜
such that
Al,T˜ = Ah,0
((
Lˆ (κ)
)1−α−1/( Lw
1− κ
)α
(ZHw)
1/−1
)
.
Thereafter the BGP dynamics apply.
The characterization of the equilibrium consumption trajectories is presented
in the next subsection.
Characterization of the equilibrium consumption trajectories and wel-
fare. — To complete the analysis of the full equilibrium dynamics, in section
we characterize the equilibrium consumption trajectory. In particular, we solve
for C0 for arbitrary initial conditions that may be inconsistent with a BGP. We
denote by T˜ the time in which the economy attains the BGP. The BGP expression
of consumption yields
C
Al
=
(
Y (Ah, Al, κ)
Al
− µg
(
1 +
Ah
Al
))
,
C
Ah
=
(
Y (Ah, Al, κ)
Ah
− µg
(
1 +
(
Ah
Al
)−1))
,
where g =
{[
Lˆ1−α
(
Lw + λ
1/αLe/τ
)α]−1
+ (ZHw)
−1
} 1
−1
(1− α) /µ − ρ and,
recall, Ah/Al, Y/Ah and Y/Al are constant in a BGP. Then, in case 1 (κ ≤ κˆ),
CT˜ =
(
Y (Ah, Al, κ)
Al
− µg
(
1 +
(
Ah
Al
)))
×Al,0,
whereas, in case 2 (κ > κˆ),
CT˜ =
(
Y (Ah, Al, κ)
Ah
− µg
(
1 +
(
Ah
Al
)−1))
×Ah,0.
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In addition, for all t ≤ T˜ , the time paths of κ, Ah,t and Al,t are fully determined.
Note, in particular, that in case 1 Al,T˜ = Al,0, and in case 2 Ah,T˜ = Ah,0, which
yields the expressions for all other variables at time T˜ (in terms of the BGP
expressions of Ah/Al, Y/Ah and Y/Al).
Given the terminal conditions {CT˜ , Ah,T˜ , Al,T˜ , κT˜ }, the system of differential
equation (A13)–(A14) in case 1 and (A15)-(A16) in case 2 can be integrated
backwards to yield a solution for {CT , Ah,T , Al,T , κT }, where, recall, T is the the
endpoint of the first stage of the transition (pure offshoring). Likewise, one can
use {CT , Ah,T , Al,T , κT } as the terminal condition of the first stage of the transi-
tion to integrate backwards the system of differential equations (A10)-(A11), and
find a solution for the initial consumption, C0, given the other initial conditions,
Ah,0, Al,0, κ0.
These consumption trajectories refer to the world representative agent. To
compute the discounted utility of different types of agents, use the Euler equation
to write agent i’s discounted utility evaluated at time t = 0 as:
(A17) Ui,0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnCi,tdt =
lnCi,0
ρ
+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(∫ t
0
rsds− ρt
)
dt.
The initial consumption, Ci,0, can be found by combining the Euler equation and
the lifetime budget constraint:
(A18) Ci,0 = ρ
(∫ ∞
0
wi,t exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rsds
)
dt+ ai,0
)
,
where wi,t is agent i’s wage and ai,0 is the value of his asset holdings at t = 0.
The only assets in positive net supply in the economy are claims to the profit flow
of existing firms. The present value of firm j evaluated at time t = 0 is given by
Vj,0 =
∫∞
0 exp
(
− ∫ t0 rsds) pij,tdt. Along a BGP, Vj,0 = µ. However, during the
first stage of the transition we have Vj,0 < µ, and so the offshoring shock causes
a capital loss to asset owners (by increasing the world interest rate).
A6. Effect of Offshoring Opportunities When σ < 
In this section, we establish the comparative statics of a change in κ on wages
and skill premia when offshoring is exogenous (Proposition 6), and the compara-
tive statics of a change in λ on offshoring, the direction of technical change, the
interest rate wages (Proposition 7) and on wages and skill premia (Proposition
8) when offshoring is endogenous. Proofs are omitted as they follow immediately
from the proofs of Propositions 1, 3 and 4.
38 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose 1 < σ < . With exogenous technology and off-
shoring, an increase in offshoring, parameterized by an increase in κ:
(i) increase the real wage of skilled workers in the West, wh,w and the real wage
of unskilled workers in the East, wl,e;
(ii) the impact of κ on wl,w and ωw are inverse U-shaped: they increase wl,w and
decrease ωw for low initial values of κ; they decrease wl,w and increase ωw for
high initial values of κ.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose 1 < σ <  and ρσµ < min {Lw, ZHw}. In the BGP,
greater offshoring opportunities parameterized by an increase of λ:
(i) increase the offshoring rate, κ;
(ii) induce UBTC, i.e., lower Ah/Al;
(iii) increase the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the growth rate, g.
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose 1 < σ <  and ρσµ < min {Lw, ZHw}. In the BGP,
greater offshoring opportunities parameterized by an increase of λ:
(i) reduce the wage gap between unskilled workers in the East and in the West,
wl,e/wl,w;
(ii) decrease the skill premium, ωw, if
σ
σ−1 < ; induce a U-shaped reaction in the
skill premium, ωw, if
σ
σ−1 >  [i.e., decrease ωw for low initial λ, and increase ωw
for high initial λ];
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Figure B1. Offshoring and the Skill Premium
The figure shows the relationship between offshoring (κ) and the skill premium in the West
(ω) for the cases  = 1.6, σ = 3.33 (solid), σ = 1.11 (dashed). See Section 3.4 for the remaining
parameters.
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Figure B2. Offshoring and Wages
The figure shows the relationship between offshoring (κ) and wage levels, wh,w (red), wl,w
(solid) and wl,e (dashed), for the case  = 1.6 and σ = 3.33. See Section 3.4 for the remaining
parameters.
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Figure B3. Offshoring and Directed Technical Change
The figure shows the relationship between the offshoring rate, κ =
(
1 + λ−1/ατLw/Le
)−1
,
and Ah/Al for the case  = 1.6, σ = 5 (dashed) and σ = 3.33 (solid). See Section 3.4 for the
remaining parameters.
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Figure B4. Offshoring and the Skill Premium
The figure shows the relationship between the skill premium in the West (ω) and the off-
shoring rate (κ = (1 + λ−1/ατLw/Le)−1) for endogenous technology (solid) and exogenous
technology (dashed). The main parameters are  = 1.6, σ = 3.33 and the others are described
in Section 3.4.
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Figure B5. Transitional dynamics after an increase in λ
The figure shows the response of high-skill wages (top), low-skill wages in the West (middle)
and low-skill wages in the East (bottom). Panel a, on the left, shows the response of wages
to a shock that induces SBTC (low initial κ). Panel b, on the right, shows the response of
wages to a shock that induces UBTC (high initial κ). Dashed lines show the corresponding
no-shock counterfactual.
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Figure B6. High-Skill Offshoring and the Skill Premium
The figure shows the relationship between offshoring (λ) and the world skill premium (ω)
for the cases  = 1.6, σ = 3.33, He/Le = 0.11 (dashed), He/Le = 0 (solid). See Section 3.4 for
the other parameters.
